Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change

We ask whether firms hedge optimally by analyzing the impact the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule changes have had, which exogenously imposed board composition changes on a subset of firms, on financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk management in non-financial firms we...

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Main Authors: HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui, PEYER, Urs, SEGAL, Benjamin
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1345
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2344/viewcontent/DoFirmsHedgeOptimally_2013_wp.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soa_research-23442018-02-12T05:38:37Z Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui PEYER, Urs SEGAL, Benjamin We ask whether firms hedge optimally by analyzing the impact the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule changes have had, which exogenously imposed board composition changes on a subset of firms, on financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk management in non-financial firms we find that treated firms reduce their financial hedging, in a difference-in-difference framework. The reduction is concentrated in firms with higher conflicts of interests, such as a high CEO equity ownership level, which exposes them to more idiosyncratic risk, and a higher occurrence of option backdating. We reject the hypothesis that newly majority-independent boards reduce financial hedging due to a lack of knowledge. First, we find no difference in financial hedging for firms where SOX mandated the addition of a financial expert relative to those that already had such expertise. Second, shareholder value increases more during the period of time of the listing rule deliberations for treated firms that hedge prior to the treatment. We conclude that some firms hedge too much reducing shareholder value potentially to the benefit of under-diversified CEOs. We also show that board independence serves to reinforce monitoring which allows boards to cut back on excessive financial hedging 2013-08-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1345 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2344/viewcontent/DoFirmsHedgeOptimally_2013_wp.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Accountancy eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Board independence hedging Accounting Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Board independence
hedging
Accounting
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Board independence
hedging
Accounting
Corporate Finance
HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui
PEYER, Urs
SEGAL, Benjamin
Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
description We ask whether firms hedge optimally by analyzing the impact the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule changes have had, which exogenously imposed board composition changes on a subset of firms, on financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk management in non-financial firms we find that treated firms reduce their financial hedging, in a difference-in-difference framework. The reduction is concentrated in firms with higher conflicts of interests, such as a high CEO equity ownership level, which exposes them to more idiosyncratic risk, and a higher occurrence of option backdating. We reject the hypothesis that newly majority-independent boards reduce financial hedging due to a lack of knowledge. First, we find no difference in financial hedging for firms where SOX mandated the addition of a financial expert relative to those that already had such expertise. Second, shareholder value increases more during the period of time of the listing rule deliberations for treated firms that hedge prior to the treatment. We conclude that some firms hedge too much reducing shareholder value potentially to the benefit of under-diversified CEOs. We also show that board independence serves to reinforce monitoring which allows boards to cut back on excessive financial hedging
format text
author HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui
PEYER, Urs
SEGAL, Benjamin
author_facet HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui
PEYER, Urs
SEGAL, Benjamin
author_sort HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui
title Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
title_short Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
title_full Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
title_fullStr Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
title_full_unstemmed Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
title_sort do firms hedge optimally? evidence from an exogenous governance change
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2013
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1345
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2344/viewcontent/DoFirmsHedgeOptimally_2013_wp.pdf
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