Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
We ask whether firms hedge optimally by analyzing the impact the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule changes have had, which exogenously imposed board composition changes on a subset of firms, on financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk management in non-financial firms we...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui, PEYER, Urs, SEGAL, Benjamin |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1345 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2344/viewcontent/DoFirmsHedgeOptimally_2013_wp.pdf |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence from an exogenous governance change
by: HUANG, Sterling, et al.
Published: (2013) -
Zombie board:board tenure and firm performance
by: HUANG, Sterling Zhenrui
Published: (2013) -
Corporate Governance in Singapore – The Road Thus Far
by: Lan, Luh Luh
Published: (2023) -
The differential effects of classified boards on firm value
by: Ahn, S., et al.
Published: (2016) -
Activist-appointed directors
by: Kang, Jun-Koo, et al.
Published: (2022)