The Frequency of Say-on-Pay Vote, Shareholder Value, and Corporate Governance: Initial Evidence from the U.S. Firms
In this study, I examine (1) the market reaction to the shareholders’ decision on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote, and (2) the relation between such decision and firms’ existing corporate governance structures. When firms released the results of shareholders’ frequency vote in Form 8-K, I find...
محفوظ في:
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | LI, Na, Gus, DeFranco |
---|---|
التنسيق: | text |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
|
الموضوعات: | |
الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1415 |
الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
|
مواد مشابهة
-
Institutional antecedents to shareholder monitoring: The liability of localness in shareholder votes
بواسطة: UCHIDA, Daisuke, وآخرون
منشور في: (2021) -
Say on pay voting: understanding executive pay assessments through the lens of information-processing theory
بواسطة: Wichawadee Racharoenkit
منشور في: (2023) -
Beyond shareholder value? Why firms voluntarily disclose support for Black Lives Matter
بواسطة: CHEN, A. J., وآخرون
منشور في: (2021) -
The board will now vote
بواسطة: Singapore Management University
منشور في: (2017) -
Accounting-Based Regulation and Protection of Minority Shareholders
بواسطة: WANG, Jiwei, وآخرون
منشور في: (2005)