The Frequency of Say-on-Pay Vote, Shareholder Value, and Corporate Governance: Initial Evidence from the U.S. Firms
In this study, I examine (1) the market reaction to the shareholders’ decision on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote, and (2) the relation between such decision and firms’ existing corporate governance structures. When firms released the results of shareholders’ frequency vote in Form 8-K, I find...
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Main Authors: | LI, Na, Gus, DeFranco |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1415 |
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