Auditor choice and information asymmetry: Evidence from international syndicated loans
Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1814 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2841/viewcontent/Auditor_Choice_IA_sv.pdf |
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