Auditor choice and information asymmetry: Evidence from international syndicated loans

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: MA, Zhiming, STICE, Derrald, WANG, Rencheng
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
• الموضوعات: big N auditors; international debt markets; loan syndicate structure; creditor rights; trust; Accounting; Corporate Finance
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1814; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2841/viewcontent/Auditor_Choice_IA_sv.pdf

Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower...