Contracting with controllable risk

Contracting with controllable risk

We examine how executives' ability to control their firms' exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Our natural experimental evidence shows that exchange-traded weather derivatives allow executives to control their firms' exposure to weather risk....

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: ARMSTRONG, Christopher S., GLAESER, Stephen A., HUANG, Sterling
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
Subjects:
executive compensation
contract design
equity incentives
risk-taking incentives
stock options
derivatives
hedging
natural experiment
Accounting
Corporate Finance
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1982
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/3009/viewcontent/ContractingControllableRisk_2021_sv.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1982
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/3009/viewcontent/ContractingControllableRisk_2021_sv.pdf

Similar Items