Contracting with controllable risk
We examine how executives' ability to control their firms' exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Our natural experimental evidence shows that exchange-traded weather derivatives allow executives to control their firms' exposure to weather risk....
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Main Authors: | ARMSTRONG, Christopher S., GLAESER, Stephen A., HUANG, Sterling |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1982 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/3009/viewcontent/ContractingControllableRisk_2021_sv.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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