A Method for Evaluating the Behavior of Power Indices in Weighted Plurality Games
In this paper, a systematic method to facilitate the comparison of a priori measures of power in an n-player r-candidate (n, r) weighted plurality game is proposed. This method, which exploits the notion of a structure of embedded winning coalitions (SEWC), enables the listing of all power profiles...
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Main Authors: | Chua, Vincent, Ueng, C. H., Huang, H. C. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2002
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/205 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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