The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games
In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case a...
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2003
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-12052024-04-12T07:53:28Z The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games CHUA, Vincent C. H. Huang, H. C. In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power. 2003-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/206 info:doi/10.1007/s003550200186 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1205/viewcontent/s003550200186.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Vote power binary game donation paradox Behavioral Economics Econometrics |
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Vote power binary game donation paradox Behavioral Economics Econometrics |
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Vote power binary game donation paradox Behavioral Economics Econometrics CHUA, Vincent C. H. Huang, H. C. The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games |
| description |
In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power. |
| format |
text |
| author |
CHUA, Vincent C. H. Huang, H. C. |
| author_facet |
CHUA, Vincent C. H. Huang, H. C. |
| author_sort |
CHUA, Vincent C. H. |
| title |
The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games |
| title_short |
The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games |
| title_full |
The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games |
| title_fullStr |
The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games |
| title_sort |
shapley-shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2003 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/206 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1205/viewcontent/s003550200186.pdf |
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