The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games

• Main Authors: CHUA, Vincent C. H., Huang, H. C.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2003
• Subjects: Vote power; binary game; donation paradox; Behavioral Economics; Econometrics
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/206; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1205/viewcontent/s003550200186.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case a...