Instability and the incentives for corruption

Instability and the incentives for corruption

We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Campante, Filipe R., CHOR, Davin, DO, Quoc-Anh
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
Subjects:
corruption
electoral system
empirical analysis
governance approach
incentive
party politics
political instability
political theory
theoretical study
International Economics
Political Economy
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/409
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1408/viewcontent/Campante_InstabilityIncentives.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/409
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1408/viewcontent/Campante_InstabilityIncentives.pdf

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