Instability and the incentives for corruption

• Main Authors: Campante, Filipe R., CHOR, Davin, DO, Quoc-Anh
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
• Subjects: corruption; electoral system; empirical analysis; governance approach; incentive; party politics; political instability; political theory; theoretical study; International Economics; Political Economy
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/409; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1408/viewcontent/Campante_InstabilityIncentives.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during...