Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership

We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probabili...

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Main Authors: LANDI, Massimiliano, Sacco, Pier Luigi
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2001
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/511
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-15102010-09-23T05:48:03Z Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership LANDI, Massimiliano Sacco, Pier Luigi We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] 2001-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/511 Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Economics
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Economics
spellingShingle Economics
LANDI, Massimiliano
Sacco, Pier Luigi
Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
description We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
format text
author LANDI, Massimiliano
Sacco, Pier Luigi
author_facet LANDI, Massimiliano
Sacco, Pier Luigi
author_sort LANDI, Massimiliano
title Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
title_short Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
title_full Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
title_fullStr Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
title_full_unstemmed Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
title_sort norms of cooperation in a game of partnership
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2001
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/511
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