Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership
We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probabili...
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Main Authors: | LANDI, Massimiliano, Sacco, Pier Luigi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2001
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/511 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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