An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout with Conformist Citizens

An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout with Conformist Citizens

We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptot...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LANDI, Massimiliano, Sodini, Mauro
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
Subjects:
Turnout
coordination games
Poisson games
conformism
selection dynamics.
Behavioral Economics
Political Science
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1245
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2244/viewcontent/TurnoutDinamicoWP.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1245
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2244/viewcontent/TurnoutDinamicoWP.pdf

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