An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout with Conformist Citizens
We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptot...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1245 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2244/viewcontent/TurnoutDinamicoWP.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |