The Auditor and the Firm: A Simple Model of Corporate Cheating and Intermediation

• المؤلف الرئيسي: GUHA, Brishti
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2005
• الموضوعات: Moral hazard; firm size; managerial compensation; repeated games; Behavioral Economics; Economics
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/858; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1857/viewcontent/firmauditor.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We apply a game-theoretic model to the analysis of the recent spate of corporate scandals in which firms have cheated their investors, often with the aid of external auditors. We characterize the different types of equilibria that obtain for different parameter ranges in an auditor’s absence (the pa...