The Auditor and the Firm: A Simple Model of Corporate Cheating and Intermediation
We apply a game-theoretic model to the analysis of the recent spate of corporate scandals in which firms have cheated their investors, often with the aid of external auditors. We characterize the different types of equilibria that obtain for different parameter ranges in an auditor’s absence (the pa...
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/858 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1857/viewcontent/firmauditor.pdf |
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