Rational and Boundedly Rational Behavior in Sender-Receiver Games
The authors investigate the strategic rationale behind the message sent by Osama bin Laden on the eve of the 2004 U.S. Presidential elections. They model this situation as a signaling game in which a population of receivers takes a binary choice, the outcome is decided by majority rule, sender and r...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/897 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/1896/viewcontent/Rational_behavior.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |