Toward general robustness evaluation of incentive mechanism against bounded rationality

Toward general robustness evaluation of incentive mechanism against bounded rationality

An incentive mechanism is designed to achieve desired outcomes as Nash equilibrium, by assuming agents to be fully rational. Nevertheless, practical agents may violate this assumption for various reasons, causing mechanisms to fail. Thus, before deploying a mechanism in practice, it is crucial to qu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hu, Zehong, Zhang, Jie
Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2020
Subjects:
Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Bounded Rationality
Incentive Mechanism
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/140632
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English

Internet

https://hdl.handle.net/10356/140632

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