Toward general robustness evaluation of incentive mechanism against bounded rationality

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Hu, Zehong, Zhang, Jie
• مؤلفون آخرون: School of Computer Science and Engineering
• التنسيق: مقال
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2020
• الموضوعات: Engineering::Computer science and engineering; Bounded Rationality; Incentive Mechanism
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/140632

An incentive mechanism is designed to achieve desired outcomes as Nash equilibrium, by assuming agents to be fully rational. Nevertheless, practical agents may violate this assumption for various reasons, causing mechanisms to fail. Thus, before deploying a mechanism in practice, it is crucial to qu...