To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis

To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis

In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain thi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: HUANG, Fali
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2007
Subjects:
Monitoring
Trustworthiness
Trust
Screening
Economic Governance
Behavioral Economics
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf

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