To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis

In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain thi...

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Main Author: HUANG, Fali
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2007
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-20282019-04-22T15:19:29Z To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis HUANG, Fali In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trustworthiness as a response to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which may actually drive up the overall governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence. 2007-08-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Monitoring Trustworthiness Trust Screening Economic Governance Behavioral Economics Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Monitoring
Trustworthiness
Trust
Screening
Economic Governance
Behavioral Economics
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
spellingShingle Monitoring
Trustworthiness
Trust
Screening
Economic Governance
Behavioral Economics
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
HUANG, Fali
To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
description In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trustworthiness as a response to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which may actually drive up the overall governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence.
format text
author HUANG, Fali
author_facet HUANG, Fali
author_sort HUANG, Fali
title To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
title_short To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
title_full To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
title_fullStr To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
title_full_unstemmed To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
title_sort to trust or to monitor: a dynamic analysis
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2007
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf
_version_ 1770569377389740032