To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis
In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain thi...
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2007
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1029 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2028/viewcontent/TrustGovernance20070924ET.pdf |
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