Labor Hoarding Contracts and Coordination Fictions
This paper considers a directed search model with risk-neutral firms and risk-averse workers. Although each firm has only one job to fill, firms can hire as many workers as they wish, and the wage a worker is paid can be contingent on the queue length at the firm and his position in the queue. We fi...
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Main Authors: | JACQUET, Nicolas L., TAN, Serene |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1091 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2090/viewcontent/HoardingApril2008.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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