Quasi-option Value under Strategic Interactions

We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-bes...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: FUJII, Tomoki, ISHIKAWA, Ryuichiro
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1261
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2260/viewcontent/qov_game_04_2011.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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