Custodes Invicem Custodiunt: Commitment through Competition
How can specialists in violence, such as the military or the police, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition between these agents as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation. In our model, even if specialists in violence could expropriate all output costl...
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Main Authors: | ANEY, Madhav S., KO, Giovanni |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1295 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2294/viewcontent/MadhavSAney_Custodes_Invicem_Custodiunt.pdf |
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