Does Competition within the Military Reduce Expropriation?
How can agents in the military, which control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model, even if agents within the milita...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1483 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2482/viewcontent/competitionmilitary.pdf |
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