Does Competition within the Military Reduce Expropriation?

How can agents in the military, which control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model, even if agents within the milita...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: ANEY, Madhav S., Ko, Giovanni
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1483
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2482/viewcontent/competitionmilitary.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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