Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs

This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two players in an environment with one sided asymmetric information when their reservation payoffs depend on the type of the informed player, causing the reservation payoff of the uninformed player to be unobservable to her. Inefficien...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: ANEY, Madhav S.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1870
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2870/viewcontent/Inefficiency_in_the_Shadow_of_Unobservable_Outside_Options_afv.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English