Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two players in an environment with one sided asymmetric information when their reservation payoffs depend on the type of the informed player, causing the reservation payoff of the uninformed player to be unobservable to her. Inefficien...
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Main Author: | ANEY, Madhav S. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1870 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2870/viewcontent/Inefficiency_in_the_Shadow_of_Unobservable_Outside_Options_afv.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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