Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1350 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2349/viewcontent/CrimeMoralHazard_2012.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions. |
|---|