Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-23492017-08-04T04:46:48Z Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions. 2012-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1350 info:doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2349/viewcontent/CrimeMoralHazard_2012.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics |
| institution |
Singapore Management University |
| building |
SMU Libraries |
| continent |
Asia |
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Singapore Singapore |
| content_provider |
SMU Libraries |
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InK@SMU |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics |
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Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? |
| description |
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions. |
| format |
text |
| author |
GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. |
| author_facet |
GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. |
| author_sort |
GUHA, Brishti |
| title |
Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? |
| title_short |
Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? |
| title_full |
Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? |
| title_fullStr |
Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? |
| title_sort |
crime and moral hazard: does more policing necessarily induce private negligence? |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1350 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2349/viewcontent/CrimeMoralHazard_2012.pdf |
| _version_ |
1770571181726892032 |