Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	GUHA, Brishti, GUHA, Ashok S.
Format:	text
Language:	English
Published:	Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2012
Subjects:	Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics Economics
Online Access:	https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1427 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2426/viewcontent/crime_av.pdf
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Institution:	Singapore Management University
Language:	English

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spelling	sg-smu-ink.soe_research-24262020-01-24T00:18:52Z Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence? GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions. 2012-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1427 info:doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2426/viewcontent/crime_av.pdf Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics Economics
institution	Singapore Management University
building	SMU Libraries
continent	Asia
country	Singapore Singapore
content_provider	SMU Libraries
collection	InK@SMU
language	English
topic	Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics Economics
spellingShingle	Crime Policing Private precautions Moral hazard Diversification Behavioral Economics Economics GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S. Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
description	Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
format	text
author	GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S.
author_facet	GUHA, Brishti GUHA, Ashok S.
author_sort	GUHA, Brishti
title	Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
title_short	Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
title_full	Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
title_fullStr	Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
title_full_unstemmed	Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?
title_sort	crime and moral hazard: does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?
publisher	Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate	2012
url	https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1427 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2426/viewcontent/crime_av.pdf
_version_	1770571451563245568

Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?

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