Contract Enforcement: A Political Economy Model of Legal Development

In an effort to understand why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts differs across societies, this article builds a political economy model of legal development where legal quality of contract enforcement is a costly public good. It finds that legal investment tends to be too small u...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: HUANG, Fali
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1437
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2436/viewcontent/ContractEnforcement_2012_pv.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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