Quasi-option value under strategic interactions
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-bes...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1442 |
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