Quasi-option value under strategic interactions
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-bes...
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Main Authors: | FUJII, Tomoki, ISHIKAWA, R. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1442 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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