Sequential Investment, Hold-up and Strategic Delay
We investigate hold-up with simultaneous and sequential investment. We show that if the encouragement effect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay effect, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. Further, if it is allowed to choose whe...
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Main Authors: | ZHANG, Juyuan, ZHANG, Yi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1472 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2471/viewcontent/workshop_5CSequentialHoldup_dynamic.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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