Egalitarian Division under Leontief Preferences

Egalitarian Division under Leontief Preferences

We consider the problem of fairly dividing l divisible goods among n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity,...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LI, Jin, XUE, Jingyi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
Fair division
Egalitarian rules
Group strategy-proofness
Generalized Leontief preferences
Social choice
Exchange economies
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1622
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2621/viewcontent/Egalitarian_division_under_Leontief_preferences_afv.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1622
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2621/viewcontent/Egalitarian_division_under_Leontief_preferences_afv.pdf

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