Egalitarian Division under Leontief Preferences

• Main Authors: LI, Jin, XUE, Jingyi
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
• Subjects: Fair division; Egalitarian rules; Group strategy-proofness; Generalized Leontief preferences; Social choice; Exchange economies; Economic Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1622; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2621/viewcontent/Egalitarian_division_under_Leontief_preferences_afv.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

We consider the problem of fairly dividing l divisible goods among n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately owned.