On strategy-proofness and the salience of sIngle-peakedness

On strategy-proofness and the salience of sIngle-peakedness

We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, MASSO, Jordi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
Subjects:
Strategy-proofness
Single-peakedness
Anonymity
Unanimity
Tops-onlyness
Semilattice
Economics
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1720
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2719/viewcontent/Chatterji_et_al_2018_International_Economic_Review.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1720
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2719/viewcontent/Chatterji_et_al_2018_International_Economic_Review.pdf

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