On strategy-proofness and the salience of sIngle-peakedness
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to...
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Main Authors: | CHATTERJI, Shurojit, MASSO, Jordi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1720 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2719/viewcontent/Chatterji_et_al_2018_International_Economic_Review.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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