Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, ZENG, Huaxia
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2017
• الموضوعات: Generalized random dictatorships; Top-separable domains; Connected domains; Multidimensional single-peaked domains; Constrained voting; Behavioral Economics; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2108; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3108/viewcontent/Chatterji_Zeng_Random_Mechanism_Design_on_Multidimensional_Domains____1_.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion...