Tops-only domains

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternativesA and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics ofdomains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice functionf : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1890
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2890/viewcontent/9054366.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English