On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SANVER, Remzi, SEN, Arunava
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1229
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2228/viewcontent/semispmay10.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English