On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

• Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SANVER, Rezmi, SEN, Arunava
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
• Subjects: Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains; Semi-single-peaked domains; Economic Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1790; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2789/viewcontent/P_ID_52661_DomainsAdmitWell_BehavedStrategy_ProofSocialChoiceFn_2010_pp.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be...