On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1790 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2789/viewcontent/P_ID_52661_DomainsAdmitWell_BehavedStrategy_ProofSocialChoiceFn_2010_pp.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982). |
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