Tops-only domains
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternativesA and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics ofdomains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice functionf : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only...
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Main Authors: | CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1890 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2890/viewcontent/9054366.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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