How Effective Can Ex Post Destruction Alleviate the Hold-up Problem?
We first investigate whether or not ex post destruction can possibly alleviate the hold-up problem in a one-shot game between a supplier and a buyer. The answer is yes but only when the buyer believes that the supplier might be a Homo reciprocans agent with sufficiently strong propensity for reciproc...
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Main Authors: | WANG, Huan, ZHANG, Juyuan, ZHANG, Yi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2014
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1755 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2754/viewcontent/Ex_Post_Destruction_Hold_up_Problem_2014_wp.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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