Expropriation risk and competition within the military

How can agents in the military, who control the means of coercion, commit not to expropriate from producers? In this paper we propose competition within the military as one of the mechanisms that can deter predation and consequently create commitment. In our model, even if agents within the military...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: ANEY, Madhav S., KO, Giovanni
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1868
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2868/viewcontent/siv.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
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